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O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  n a basic level, digital data is composed of a complex succession of 1s 
and 0s. As I key in this very sentence, my software accurately processes the 
otherwise unreadable data into the words that I am composing. A printed 
copy of my software-processed data is of course a tangible object—we speak 
in terms of “hard” and “soft” copy to distinguish physical from virtual. Some 
of us from earlier generations, myself included, still prefer to move from soft 
to hard copy and back again, but it is impossible to function in a contempo-
rary industrialized economy without recognizing the sheer ubiquity of digital 
data. Even that small minority of the population that does not own a 
smartphone or have any online presence in social media is still likely to use 
email, watch television, possess a debit or credit card for financial transac-
tions, own a passport, visit a medical professional, use public services or fa-
cilities, attend school, drive a motor vehicle, use public transport, use elec-
tricity from a grid, use running water from a connected supply, or walk in a 
public space and be filmed on closed-circuit television. A twenty-first cen-
tury human life isolated from electronic data is an increasing rarity. 
The technicalities of the electronic composition of data and the ubiquity 
of its presence in twenty-first century life does not capture the full signifi-
cance of personal data. My ability to key in text is, of course, a consequence 
of the development of word processing, but I also want to preserve my in-
tellectual property in the sentences that I construct. My thought processes 
that lead to the selection of keys in the construction of words is my intangible 
property. Another person’s appropriation of my intellectual property with-
out attribution constitutes plagiarism—and that is an offense in academic 
circles where we rightfully expect that the work a professor or a student puts 
his or her own name to is indeed his or her own—unless attribution to oth-
ers’ work is duly made. My legal entitlement to the integrity of the authorship 
of my self-generated data is reflective of widespread and popular acceptance 
that data is more than a complex succession of 1s and 0s. And it is not the 
case that intellectual property in one’s self-generated data is the full extent of 
our sense of proprietorial interest. Personal data, including home address, 
investment portfolio details, passport details, social security number, credit 
card and personal banking details, personal health records, and so forth in-
clude the sorts of information few of us want freely available to the public. 
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In a recent article in The Economist, the editorial staff explores the emerg-
ing argument that people should be paid for their personal data.1 Given that 
corporate entities are already prepared to pay for data supplied by technology 
firms, why not cut out the intermediaries and allow individuals to sell their 
own data if they choose to do so? The Cambridge Analytica debacle, which 
resulted in the acquisition of the personal data of 87 million Facebook users 
without the consent or knowledge of those users, has sharpened focus on 
this issue.2 Even Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, has challenged re-
searchers to quantify the economic value of personal data.3 In our digitally 
connected world, personal data has become an important commodity. 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND CYBER ATTACKS 
 
Academic scholarship and popular literature tends to describe all known of-
fensive cyber operations generically as “attacks.”4 Accordingly, legal scholars 
such as Noam Lubell lament the popular misuse of the term “attack” to de-
scribe all offensive cyber operations because of the legal uncertainty that the 
misuse of the term creates.5 Thus, he argues: “For the sake of legal clarity, it 
would therefore be advisable to utilize a more legally neutral (at least under 
the jus in bello) description and—unless intending to define an event as an 
attack under LOAC—to speak of cyber operations rather than cyber at-
tacks.”6 I agree with Lubell and I will use the term “cyber operations” 
                                                                                                                      
1. See What If People Were Paid for Their Data?: Advocates of “Data as Labour” Think Users 
Should be Paid for Using Online Services, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2018), https://www.econo-
mist.com/the-world-if/2018/07/07/what-if-people-were-paid-for-their-data. 
2. Michael Riley, Sarah Frier & Stephanie Baker, Understanding the Facebook-Cambridge 
Analytica Story: Quick Take, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 9, 2018, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/business/understanding-the-facebook-cambridge-analytica-story-quick-
take/2018/04/09/0f18d91c-3c1c-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html. 
3. What If People Were Paid for Their Data?, supra note 1. 
4. A recent example of this tendency involved journalists reporting on the September 
2018 cyber security breach at Facebook in which approximately 50 million users had their 
individual access tokens compromised. See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Secu-
rity Breach Exposes Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2018, https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html; see also Julia Carrie 
Wong, Facebook Says Nearly 50m Users Compromised in Huge Security Breach, GUARDIAN (Lon-
don) Sept. 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/sep/28/facebook-
50-million-user-accounts-security-berach. 
5. Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?, 
89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 252, 258 (2013). 
6. Id. 
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throughout this article, unless citing another scholar or explicitly referring to 
an attack regulated by international humanitarian law. 
It is important for present purposes to understand the meaning of “ci-
vilian objects” and “military objectives” and the implications of these mean-
ings for electronic data. As Lubell suggests, in regulating the conduct of 
armed conflict, international humanitarian law uses “attack” as a term of art 
and specifies a number of limitations.7 Additional Protocol I defines attack 
as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”8 
In turn, international humanitarian law prohibits parties from intentionally 
directing an attack against civilians or civilian property.9 The basic rule on 
distinction, codified in Article 48(1) of Additional Protocol I, is that parties 
to an armed conflict must “distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.”10 This rule 
is integral to international humanitarian law and manifests in the twin prohi-
bitions that: (1) “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civil-
ians, shall not be the object of attack”11 and (2) “Civilian objects shall not be 
the object of attack . . . .”12 The rule also manifests in the concomitant di-
rective that “[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.”13 
Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I defines civilian objects as “all ob-
jects which are not military objectives” and Article 52(2) defines military ob-
jectives as “limited to those objects which by their nature location, purpose 
or use make an effective contribution to military action . . . .”14 Both defini-
tions—what a civilian object is not and what a military objective is—imply 
tangibility with their mutual emphasis on objects. This implied tangibility, of 
physical materiality, is made explicit in the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Additional Protocols. 
 
The English text uses the word “objects,” which means “something placed 
before the eyes, or presented to the sight or other sense, an individual thing 
seen, or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived; a material thing.” The 
                                                                                                                      
7. Id. 
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
9. Id. art. 48. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. art. 51(2). 
12. Id. art. 52(1). 
13. Id. art. 52(2). 
14. See id. art. 52(1)–(2). 
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French text uses the word “biens,” which means, “chose tangible, suscep-
tible d’appropriation.” It is clear that in both English and French the word 
means something that is visible and tangible.15 
 
In drafting the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare,16 (Tallinn Manual 1.0) the International Group of Experts had to 
grapple with the meaning of military objective and the implications of the 
definition for cyber operations. It is clear that the wording of Additional 
Protocol I and of the ICRC’s Commentary, particularly to Article 52(2), influ-
enced the drafting of Tallinn Manual 1.0 on this point, and, in my view, those 
sources are entirely appropriate sources of influence. While the International 
Group of Experts unanimously agreed, “computers, computer networks and 
other tangible components of cyber infrastructure constitute objects,”17 
opinions in the group were divided on the characterization of data. The ma-
jority of experts were of the view that “an attack on data per se does not 
qualify as an attack” because the intangibility of data is neither consistent 
with the “ordinary meaning of the term object” nor “comports with the ex-
planation of it in the ICRC Additional Protocols 1987 Commentary.”18 The 
majority of the International Group of Experts did agree that “a cyber oper-
ation targeting data may sometimes qualify as an attack when the operation 
affects the functionality of cyber infrastructure or results in other conse-
quences that would qualify the cyber operation in question as an attack.”19 
While the majority of experts did not explain what they meant by those 
“other consequences,” presumably the majority would include attacks 
against targets subject to special legal protection, such as hospitals, medical 
personnel and medical transport vehicles, vessels and aircraft, historic mon-
uments, works of art, places of worship, as well as dams, dikes, nuclear elec-
trical generating stations, and other works or installations containing forces 
dangerous to the civilian population. 
                                                                                                                      
15. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 2007–08 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski 
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
16. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-
FARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 1.0]. 
17. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OP-
ERATIONS, cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 5, at 437 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0]. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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A minority of experts took a different view of the “objectification” of 
some data. These experts held: 
 
[T]he majority position is under inclusive in the sense that failure to include 
cyber operations targeting data per se in the scope of the term “attack” 
would mean that even the deletion of essential civilian datasets such as so-
cial security data, tax records, and bank accounts would potentially escape 
the regulatory reach of the law of armed conflict, thereby running counter 
to the principle . . . that the civilian population enjoys general protection 
from the effects of hostilities. For these Experts, the key factor, based on 
the underlying object and purpose of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, 
is one of severity and the operation’s consequences, not the nature of harm. 
Thus, they were of the view that, at a minimum, civilian data that is “essen-
tial” to the well-being of the civilian population is encompassed in the no-
tion of civilian objects and protected as such.20 
 
The faithful recording of differences of opinion between the majority 
and the minority of the international group of experts is a recurrent and wel-
come feature of both Tallinn Manuals. My interest here is to identify and dis-
cuss the ramifications that flow from this particular difference of opinion. If 
data is an object, the rule on distinction applies and international humanitar-
ian law prohibits the targeting of civilian data in the context of an armed 
conflict. If data does not constitute an object, the targeting of data per se is 
not unlawful and the rule on distinction does not apply. 
Two common intuitive responses on the importance of civilian data sup-
port the minority view. One response favors maximum protection of the 
civilian population—consistent with a particular perspective on the motiva-
tion of international humanitarian law. The other response focuses on the 
contemporary ubiquity and increasing sensitivity to dependence upon data. 
I am not suggesting these two responses are exhaustive of reactions to the 
difference of opinion among the international group of experts, nor do I 
suggest that the two responses cannot coexist in the reactions of particular 
scholars. I merely observe that the responses are conceptually distinct. How-
ever, it is also true that both responses are often articulated over-simplisti-
cally as respective reactions to the majority view that data is not an object. 
That overly simplistic reactive tendency is the principal reason for my deci-
sion to characterize both response as “intuitive.” 
                                                                                                                      
20. Id. cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 6, at 437. 
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At different times in the past, I have had both responses, so I readily 
accept just how easy it is to entertain either position. For example, in a 2014 
article co-authored with Rain Liivoja, we asked whether “the time has per-
haps come to seriously consider whether an ‘object’ for the purposes of the 
targeting rules in LOAC necessarily needs to have corporeal existence.”21 
Tallinn Manual 1.0 was published in 2013 and the text finalized some time 
before that. In the intervening years, I have speculated whether, if the Inter-
national Group of Experts for Tallinn 1.0 reconvened to vote on whether an 
attack on data per se would constitute an attack, the original majority position 
would prevail, or whether some of the experts now would change their orig-
inal position such that the minority now reflected that of a new majority.  
Of course, others have noticed the lack of unanimity within the Tallinn 
1.0 group of experts on this issue. Heather Harrison Dinniss22 and Kubo 
Mačák,23 for example, both contributed to a symposium issue of the Israel 
Law Review in which they challenged the majority Tallinn 1.0 position, albeit 
on different reasoning. Michael Schmitt commented on both of their pa-
pers,24 defending the Tallinn 1.0 majority view. 
Schmitt, writing on his view of the lex lata in 2012, explicitly acknowl-
edged that international law might rapidly evolve in response to the question 
of whether data constitutes an object, stating: 
 
I will slavishly adhere to the lex lata. I have set out elsewhere my views on 
where the law might be headed, but in this article, I merely comment on 
the state of the law as of July 2012. Although I believe the law on the notion 
of objects will evolve with some rapidity, speculation is not my purpose 
here. I do realise that the majority’s interpretation of objects leads to un-
desirable results in the sense that it opens the door to cyber operations 
against data that could have a significant negative impact on the civilian 
population. However, an all-inclusive treatment of data as an object would, 
                                                                                                                      
21. Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack, Law in the Virtual Battlespace: The Tallinn Manual 
and the Jus in Bello, 15 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 53 (2012). 
22. See Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the 
Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 39 (2015). 
23. See Kubo Mačák, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects 
under International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 55 (2015). 
24. Michael N. Schmitt, The Nature of ‘Objects’ During Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence 
of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 81 (2015). 
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as will be explained, be over-inclusive. Until states determine the appropri-
ate balance, it would be precipitate to extend the meaning of objects to this 
degree.25 
 
The differing analysis and back-and-forth exchange between Harrison 
Dinniss, Mačák, and Schmitt is helpful in clarifying the parameters of the 
position articulated by the majority of experts. I will engage with that discus-
sion before moving to supplementary analysis. 
It is often wrongly assumed that the majority position leads inexorably 
to the view that any attack on data is permissible because data is not an ob-
ject. That is not an accurate reflection of the majority position. Schmitt iden-
tifies a recurrent fallacy: “critics of the majority approach sometimes conflate 
the legal meaning of the term ‘attack’ as used in Rule 37 [now Rule 100] and 
that of ‘object,’ the issue at hand with regard to data.”26 The International 
Group of Experts unanimously agreed to the articulation of Rule 30 [now 
Rule 92], as they did to all the black letter rules, on the definition of a cyber 
attack: “A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, 
that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects.”27 Accordingly, any operation undertaken against data 
with any of the aforementioned effects, the expected causing of injury or 
death to persons or damage or destruction of objects, would constitute an 
attack to which the rules on targeting apply. In the Commentary to Rule 92, 
the Group of Experts stated: 
 
The limitation in this Rule to operations against individuals or physical ob-
jects should not be understood as excluding cyber operations against data 
(which are non-physical entities) from the ambit of the term attack. When-
ever an attack on data results in the injury or death of individuals or damage 
or destruction of physical objects, those individuals or objects constitute 
the “object of attack” and the operation therefore qualifies as an attack. 
Further, as discussed below, an operation against data upon which the 
functionality of physical objects relies can sometimes constitute an attack.28 
 
Thus, operations undertaken against data with flow-on physically dam-
aging effects are unquestionably attacks that are subject to international hu-
manitarian law on distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. 
                                                                                                                      
25. Id. at 84. 
26. Id. at 86. 
27. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 92, at 415. 
28. Id. cmt. to r. 92, ¶ 6, at 416. 
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Here, there is no disagreement between the majority and the minority. All 
the Tallinn 1.0 experts agree unanimously on the characterization of such 
operations as attacks. 
Beyond those operations against data, which result in physically damag-
ing effects, hypothetical examples help to clarify the parameters of the ma-
jority position. Mačák, for example, offered two examples to challenge the 
majority position. Both examples were intended to illustrate cyber operations 
designed to destroy data without physical force that States would likely con-
sider as constituting “attacks” because of the non-physical, but nevertheless 
significant, consequences of the operations. Schmitt’s view is that neither 
example achieves its intended purpose. Both the examples and Schmitt’s 
counter-analysis are helpful. 
First, Mačák raises the example of targeting “critical data of a military 
nature, such as weapons logs, timetables for the deployment of military lo-
gistics, or air traffic control information.”29 In each case, he argues that the 
data itself is a legitimate military objective because it “makes an effective 
contribution to the military action of one party . . . [and] its destruction 
would, therefore, also offer a definite military advantage to the opposing 
party.”30 Mačák asserts that States would probably accept that such data con-
stitutes a legitimate military objective.31 
Schmitt’s response is instructive. The critical question is whether data is 
an object. If it is, then in all three cases the data is a military objective and 
can be attacked. If data is not an object, as Schmitt asserts, “it may still be 
‘targeted’ because the prohibition on attacking civilian objects does not at-
tach.”32 The result is the same either way, as parties can legitimately target 
and destroy the date, and, in Schmitt’s view, “States would be comfortable 
with either approach.”33 
Harrison Dinniss approaches her critique of the majority position differ-
ently, but one of her key examples is similar to Mačák’s first example. While 
other commentators show concern that the rejection of data as an object 
fails to protect civilian data, Harrison Dinniss instead notes that the rejection 
of data as an object may lead to immunity from attack for military data: 
 
                                                                                                                      
29. Mačák, supra note 23, at 76. 
30. Id. 
31. Id.  
32. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 98. 
33. Id.  
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To take a practical example, weapons, weapons systems and military matériel 
are perhaps the epitome of a legitimate military objective. Malware that is 
designed specifically to cause death, injury, destruction or damage is indis-
putably a weapon. Examples include Stuxnet-type code, which is intended 
to cause physical destruction, or even viruses such as Wiper, which de-
stroyed the functionality of computer systems without destroying any phys-
ical components. However, by excluding intangible objects such as code 
from the interpretation of the definition offered by the majority of the Tal-
linn group, neither of these cyber weapons would constitute a legitimate 
military objective. It cannot be correct that one can have a weapon that is 
made entirely from code that does not constitute a military objective. 
 
As the definition of civilian objects is provided in a negative form – that is, 
civilian objects are all things that are not military objectives – we are left 
with two main alternatives. Either a piece of code such as Stuxnet is a ci-
vilian object or, given that the problem is with the term “object” itself, it is 
not covered by the definition of military objectives at all. Given that the 
object and purpose of both the principle of distinction and of the Addi-
tional Protocol itself is to provide effective protection for civilians and ci-
vilian objects while enabling parties to an armed conflict to conduct effec-
tive military operations, either of those alternatives produces a manifestly 
unreasonable result. In order to conduct efficient military operations 
against cyber targets while minimising the harm to civilians and civilian ob-
jects, it will sometimes be necessary to conduct attacks against code rather 
than the physical infrastructure on which it rests. Any modern interpreta-
tion of the law should reflect this necessity and allow for that to happen.34 
 
Schmitt dismisses the concern as he did Mačák’s first example, noting 
“[i]rrespective of the view one takes on the object issue, Stuxnet-like code is 
clearly targetable in an armed conflict.”35 If data is not an object, as the Tal-
linn 1.0 majority asserts, then the prohibition on targeting civilian objects 
does not apply and Stuxnet-like code is targetable. However, even if data is 
an object, the Tallinn 1.0 minority position, Stuxnet-like code unquestionably 
satisfies the Additional Protocol I Article 52(2) criteria for a legitimate mili-
tary objective.36 
This is an important clarification on the scope of the Tallinn 1.0 major-
ity’s position. It is fallacious to assume that if data is not considered an ob-
ject, militaries will be restricted in their freedom to target and destroy data 
                                                                                                                      
34. Harrison Dinniss, supra note 22, at 44–45. 
35. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 103. 
36. Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 52(2). 
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that is being used by an adversary for military purposes. That assumption is 
simply a misunderstanding of the implications flowing from the majority’s 
position. I do not mean to imply here that these examples from Mačák and 
Harrison Dinniss are unhelpful. In fact, Harrison Dinniss is entirely accurate 
when she states, “In order to conduct efficient military operations against 
cyber targets while minimising the harm to civilians and civilian objects, it 
will sometimes be necessary to conduct attacks against code rather than the 
physical infrastructure on which it rests.”37 
The limitation with the majority position is not that military code cannot 
be targeted. Rather, it is that civilian code can also be targeted. Because the 
majority does not consider code an object, the law of targeting does not ap-
ply to operations directed against it. The examples provided by Mačák and 
Harrison Dinniss, as well as Schmitt’s explanatory responses, all illustrate 
how readily the Tallinn 1.0 majority position evokes intuitive reactions some-
times based on erroneous assumptions. Even Schmitt concedes, in relation 
to the majority’s discussion of the question of tangibility versus intangibility 
for targetable military objectives, that “in fairness to both of them [Mačák 
and Harrison Dinniss] a more robust discussion of the issue might have 
added clarity.”38 
Mačák’s second example involves the targeting of essentially civilian 
data, “such as electric health records held at a particular hospital.”39 He notes: 
 
If this data were to be clandestinely erased or altered, the lives and health 
of patients in the hospital would be endangered. This data does not, of 
course, meet the criteria of a military objective; its destruction would rather 
affect the integrity of a civilian object (the data itself) and the safety of the 
civilian population (the patients in the hospital). . . . Both of these examples 
share the fact that the direct consequence of the attacks considered would 
be solely the destruction of data. For the Tallinn Manual [1.0], such attacks 
would normally fall outside the scope of IHL unless, in addition, they were 
to interfere with the functionality of the control system to an extent requir-
ing the replacement of physical components.40 
 
Schmitt’s response is that any such targeting of electronic health records 
at a hospital would not fall outside the scope of international humanitarian 
law. 
                                                                                                                      
37. Harrison Dinniss, supra note 22, at 45. 
38. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 103. 
39. Mačák, supra note 23, at 76. 
40. Id. at 76–77. 
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To begin with, the operation is an attack irrespective of the targeting of the 
data because of the potential foreseeable harm to patients. As the IGE [In-
ternational Group of Experts] noted without dissent, the requisite conse-
quences to qualify as an attack “include any foreseeable consequential dam-
age, destruction, injury or death” and, accordingly, “[w]henever an attack 
on data results in the injury or death of individuals . . . those individuals . . 
. constitute the ‘object of attack’ and the operation qualifies as an attack.” 
Further, foreseeable collateral damage of the qualifying nature would also 
render the operation in question an attack. Finally, the example is inappo-
site because the IGE unanimously concluded in Rule 71 [now Rule 131] 
that “data that form an integral part of the operations or administration of 
medical units and transports must be respected and protected, and in par-
ticular may not be made the object of attack.”41 
 
The point of Mačák’s two examples is to expose the limitations of the 
Tallinn 1.0 majority’s position that data is not an object. Schmitt’s responses 
to both examples demonstrate that the implications of the majority position 
are slightly more nuanced than intuition might suggest. Data that might oth-
erwise constitute a legitimate military objective can lawfully be targeted and 
destroyed whether or not data is an object. Civilian health records cannot 
lawfully be targeted and destroyed whether or not data is an object. The real 
point of contention is the characterization of cyber operations directed 
against civilian data where no physical damage occurs or is reasonably ex-
pected to occur. 
Perhaps the sort of examples Mačák and others wanting to support the 
Tallinn 1.0 minority position need to provide are those that involve cyber 
operations directed against civilian data that result in the destruction or de-
letion of the data with no additional physical consequences. If data qualifies 
as an object, such operations directed against civilian data would constitute 
unlawful attacks. The Tallinn 1.0 minority briefly raise some possibilities, 
which they offer as the basis for their disagreement with the majority posi-
tion.42 Those possibilities are included in paragraph seven of the Commen-
tary to Rule 100 of Tallinn Manual 2.0.43 The minority considered that the 
exclusion of the targeting of data per se from the scope of an “attack” would 
mean 
 
                                                                                                                      
41. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 98. 
42. TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 16, cmt. to r. 38, ¶ 5, at 127. 
43. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 7, at 437. 
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even the deletion of essential civilian datasets such as social security data, 
tax records, and bank accounts would potentially escape the regulatory 
reach of the law of armed conflict, thereby running counter to the principle 
. . . that the civilian population enjoys general protection from the effects 
of hostilities.44 
 
These are helpful examples and I will return to them in due course. For 
now, it is important to note that Schmitt concedes the normative truth of 
the minority’s position if his, and the majority’s view, is incorrect.45 
 
III. THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA AND THE DELETERIOUS 
IMPACT OF CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
It would be difficult to remain unaware of the growing sensitivities to the 
significance of data and of the outrage at the increased sophistication of 
cyber operations directed against it. The following relatively recent experi-
ences are indicative of these trends and perhaps help to explain intuitive re-
actions to the Tallinn 1.0 majority position. I offer the following examples to 
illustrate the trends that I am describing. Later, I will return to the question 
of whether, if any of these examples had occurred in the context of an armed 
conflict, they would have constituted an attack subject to the rules of inter-
national humanitarian law if data does indeed constitute an object. 
Security breaches resulting in the exfiltration of data are commonplace.46 
One particularly high-profile incident involved the unauthorized penetration 
of the databases of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 
2015, which resulted in the alleged exfiltration of personal information of 
                                                                                                                      
44. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, cmt. to r. 92, ¶ 6, at 416. 
45. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 97. 
Since data is not an object, then on that basis it is not subject to the prohibition on attacking 
civilian objects; it is instead necessary to look to the consequences of its damage or destruc-
tion to determine whether the prohibition applies. However, as I have just noted above, I 
concede that if data is an object as a matter of law, the prohibition applies, albeit only if the 
cyber operation in question qualifies as an attack because the data has been damaged or 
destroyed. 
46. According to Techopedia, data exfiltration is “the unauthorized copying, transfer 
or retrieval of data from a computer or server. Data exfiltration is a malicious activity per-
formed through various different techniques, typically by cybercriminals over the Internet 
or other network. Data exfiltration is also known as data extrusion, data exportation or data 
theft.” See TECHOPEDIA, TECHNOLOGY DICTIONARY: EXFILTRATION, https://www.techo 
pedia.com/definition/14682/data-exfiltration (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). 
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more than 22 million U.S. government employees.47 It is not alleged that any 
of this data was lost or destroyed. The issue was that this vast amount of 
highly sensitive personal data was unlawfully copied and that the data alleg-
edly included not only details such as full name, date of birth, home address, 
credit card details, social security numbers, tax file numbers, passport num-
bers, and digital fingerprint records—a level of detail that could clearly facil-
itate identity theft—but also entire files for national security clearance pro-
cesses to authorize access to highly sensitive U.S. government information. 
Anyone who has been subjected to national security screening processes in 
his or her own country will appreciate just how intrusive the questioning, 
and subsequent disclosure of personal information, is. 
I have written elsewhere about the OPM hack, particularly the hyperbole 
in the ensuing public debate about the significance of the access to and theft 
of that information.48 I was surprised to read characterizations of this inci-
dent as “an act of war” or “cyber Pearl Harbor,” or that some commentators 
considered it even more serious than the 9/11 attacks because of the poten-
tial threat to U.S. national security that the targeted theft of sensitive personal 
information from such a large number of senior public servants consti-
tuted.49 There is no suggestion that the Obama administration characterized 
the operation in these terms. On the contrary, the administration received 
considerable criticism for not characterizing the operation in more severe 
terms,50 even though, from the perspective of international humanitarian 
law, it was correct not to do so. But an accurate legal analysis of what hap-
pened ought not to obfuscate the seriousness of the exfiltration of all that 
                                                                                                                      
47. Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal 
Authorities Say, WASHINGTON POST, July 9, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-
people-federal-authorities-say/. 
48. See Tim McCormack, The Sony and OPM Double Whammy: International Law and Cyber 
Attacks, 18 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW RE-
VIEW 379, 379–83 (2015) (comparing the OPM hack with the Sony Corporation hack). The 
Sony hack not only involved the loss of massive quantities of company data including details 
of yet-to-be released movies, it also resulted in a loss of functionality of at least 2,500 com-
puters. The OPM hack, in contrast, involved only the exfiltration of the data in question 
and no loss of functionality or destruction of any hardware. See id. 
49. Id. at 381–82. 
50. See, e.g., Kate Sheppard, McCain Calls Sony Hack an ‘Act of War,’ HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/21/sonynorth-korea-war n_ 
6362454.html; Mike Levine, OPM Hack: Top Lawmaker Says US ‘Under Attack,’ ABC NEWS 
(June 16, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/opm-hack-top-lawmaker-us-attack 
/story?id=31797366. 
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sensitive personal data, and the overwhelming majority of the millions of 
public servants directly affected were understandably annoyed that the 
breach had occurred. 
Exfiltration of data, while all too commonplace, is not the end of the 
“sensitivities to operations directed at data” story. Indeed, the key cyberse-
curity event in 2017 was the repeated deployment of “ransomware.” Here, 
WannaCry and NewPetra are perhaps the most well-known and devastating 
examples. Rather than the planting of malware to exfiltrate data, ransomware 
typically involves the deployment of malware to encrypt data rendering it 
inaccessible to its users. The malware then demands payment (usually in a 
cryptocurrency) for the decryption of the data, hence the “ransomware” de-
scriptor. The WannaCry operation gained higher public profile in Australia 
because some business corporations were affected and media outlets re-
ported extensively on the scale and speed that the malware spread. Early 
estimates suggested that more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries were 
impacted by the malware,51 although later reports suggested the number of 
affected computers could have been as many as 300,000.52 
Despite the scale and spread of the WannaCry malware, data was re-
accessible on most of the affected computers within a few days because of 
the rapid development and subsequent availability of software patches to 
decrypt the data. It is not hard to imagine a global, collective sigh of relief 
that this operation, and others like it, were not more damaging in their ef-
fects. One key reason for the relatively small amount of permanent damage 
was that cybersecurity measures surrounding critical infrastructure in several 
countries was sufficiently current and robust to prevent the malware’s crip-
pling encryption. Here, I do not mean to imply that National Health Service 
hospitals in the United Kingdom, where data encrypted by the malware was 
rendered inaccessible for days, do not constitute critical infrastructure. The 
point I am trying to make is that despite the global reach of the malware, the 
damage was not as severe as it might have otherwise have been. That fact, 
however, does not obviate the reality that the virulence of WannaCry and 
                                                                                                                      
51. See, e.g., Henry Belot & Stephanie Borys, Ransomware Attack Still Looms in Australia 
as Government Warns that WannaCry Threat Not Over, ABC NEWS (May 16, 2017), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-15/ransomware-attack-to-hit-victims-in-australia-
government-says/8526346. 
52. See, e.g., Dustin Voltz, U.S. Blames North Korea for ‘WannaCry’ Cyber Attack, REUTERS 
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-northkorea/u-s-blames-
north-korea-for-wannacry-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1ED00Q. 
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other ransomware contributed to a growing sensitivity to the importance of 
data to daily life in most of the world. 
Governments hardly need convincing of the growing significance of data 
and the vulnerability of their respective societies to exponential increases in 
the number of cyber operations launched every year, or in the increased so-
phistication and capacity of these operations to do harm. It is reasonable to 
expect that growing sensitivity to the importance of data would translate into 
practical measures by States, unilaterally and collectively, to reflect their in-
creasing concerns and that any such measures might extend to clarifying or 
developing international legal norms to regulate operations directed against 
data. But the issue here is not increasing awareness of the significance of 
personal data. The question is whether States are bound by a legal norm to 
the effect that data is an object thereby making the targeting of data subject 
to the rules of targeting during an armed conflict. 
 
IV. IS DATA AN OBJECT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 
 
The position of the ICRC in 2015 was: 
 
There is also increasing concern about safeguarding essential civilian data. 
With regard to data belonging to certain categories of objects that enjoy 
specific protection under IHL, the protective rules are comprehensive. For 
example, the obligation to respect and protect medical facilities must be 
understood as extending to medical data belonging to those facilities. How-
ever, it would be important to clarify the extent to which civilian data that 
does not benefit from such specific protection, such as social security data, 
tax records, bank accounts, companies’ client files or election lists or rec-
ords, is already protected by the existing general rules on the conduct of 
hostilities. Deleting or tampering with such data could quickly bring gov-
ernment services and private businesses to a complete standstill, and could 
cause more harm to civilians than the destruction of physical objects. The 
conclusion that this type of operation would not be prohibited by IHL in 
today’s ever more cyber-reliant world – either because deleting or tamper-
ing with such data would not constitute an attack in the sense of IHL or 
because such data would not be seen as an object that would bring into 
operation the prohibition of attacks on civilian objects – seems difficult to 
reconcile with the object and purpose of this body of norms.53 
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The difference of opinion between this articulation of the ICRC position 
and the Tallinn 1.0 majority is not a vast chasm. As we have seen in relation 
to Mačák’s second example discussed above, the majority position accepts 
the view of the ICRC quoted above that “data belonging to certain categories 
of objects . . . enjoy specific protection under IHL,” and that this data retains 
that protection from attack.54 
The ICRC is understandably concerned about civilian data that does not 
benefit from such specific protection, such as social security data, tax rec-
ords, bank accounts, companies’ client files, or election lists and records. The 
ICRC is keen to clarify “the extent to which such data is already protected 
by the existing general rules on the conduct of hostilities” and rightly high-
lights the possibility that “[d]eleting or tampering with such data could 
quickly bring government services and private businesses to a complete 
standstill, and could cause more harm to civilians than the destruction of 
physical objects.”55 But the Tallinn 1.0 majority also acknowledged that tar-
geting data could result in certain debilitating physical consequences. So, for 
all Tallinn experts, the targeting of any such data resulting in death or serious 
harm, or causing physical damage extending to loss of functionality of com-
puters or other physical cyber infrastructure would constitute an attack to 
which the rules of targeting apply.56 The difference between the ICRC and 
the Tallinn 1.0 majority is the same as that between the Tallinn 1.0 majority 
and minority: whether operations directed at civilian data without deleterious 
physical consequences should also be subjected to the rules of targeting. 
In relation to the examples above concerning the exfiltration of data 
from the OPM and the encryption of data by WannaCry ransomware, it is 
worth considering whether either act would constitute an attack assuming 
that both operations occurred during an armed conflict and that data is con-
sidered an object when applying international humanitarian law. 
Assuming the OPM hack only involved the exfiltration of data with no 
loss or destruction of any of that data and no loss of functionality to the 
servers on which the data was stored, unauthorized exfiltration is akin to 
remote cyber espionage, that is, cyber espionage conducted outside of the 
                                                                                                                      
the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 8–10 December 2015, 97 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
THE RED CROSS 1427, 1478 (2016). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. See TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 16, cmt. to r. 30, ¶ 6, at 107–08; TALLINN 
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physical territory of the United States. It is widely accepted that cyber espi-
onage in the context of armed conflict or in peacetime is not illegal per se.57 
Even if data is considered an object, exfiltration alone does not constitute an 
“attack” under the law of targeting. If, however, in the course of the pene-
tration of the servers and the exfiltration of the data, some of the targeted 
data was corrupted or deleted, then, if data is an object, the operation may 
have constituted an attack subject to the law of targeting. Assuming that all 
the data was of a civilian nature, which probably cannot be assumed about 
the actual OPM hack given allegations of personal data for national security 
clearance purposes, the attack would have violated international humanitar-
ian law. If WannaCry or similar ransomware had been launched in the con-
text of an armed conflict and resulted in no more damage than temporary 
encryption of civilian data that was subsequently decrypted without loss of 
the data, again, this act would not constitute an “attack” under the law of 
targeting. If, however, in the course of malicious encryption of civilian data, 
some of that data was corrupted or deleted, then the operation would have 
constituted an attack and that attack would have violated international hu-
manitarian law. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
At present, we lack examples from armed conflict of cyber operations tar-
geted against civilian data without deleterious physical consequences and, 
consequently, we also lack precedents for how States respond to the legal 
characterization of such incidents. The lack of relevant State practice renders 
how States might respond a speculative enterprise. There is undoubtedly a 
growing “objectification” of data as the incidence and sophistication of cyber 
operations dramatically increase. Ultimately, it will be for States to determine 
whether data is an object for the purposes of the law of targeting in the con-
text of an armed conflict. In this period of uncertainty, Schmitt is right to 
observe that States may well consider it in their best interest not to clarify 
the precise legal position because there may well be “situations in which a 
State would want to target civilian data directly and therefore would hesitate 
to embrace an interpretive approach that would render it a civilian object.”58 
Perhaps the clarification will come in response to a future situation 
where one party to an armed conflict deliberately targets and destroys civilian 
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banking records causing widespread anxiety but without causing any conse-
quent physical damage, and the attacking State claims to have done so legit-
imately because data is not an object, thus rendering the rules on targeting 
inapplicable. If multiple States criticized that approach, not wanting the 
banking data of their own civilian population to be targeted in a future armed 
conflict, we may then have the clarification that many desire. 
In 2018, I would support what was the minority position in 2011. When 
thinking about this issue, I fondly recall a familiar image from Tallinn, and it 
is not group singing at a local restaurant to the chagrin of all Estonians at 
our table, although that is certainly one image indelibly etched in my 
memory. I am in the room with the International Group of Experts and 
Michael Schmitt asks us to indicate our views as to whether data constitutes 
an object. It is not 2011, although I am not sure how I would have voted 
then. It is 2018, and I raise my hand in support of what was the minority 
position. I do so on the basis that the object and purpose of international 
humanitarian law is to protect the civilian population from the deleterious 
consequences of armed conflict. Part of my motivation in so voting would 
be a vested personal interest in not wanting my tax records, social security 
information, banking details, or other personal information the subject of 
targeted cyber operations if Australia becomes a party to an armed conflict 
in the future. But the international humanitarian lawyer in me would assert 
that personal vested interest is no basis for determining the existence of a 
binding legal norm. And if I was completely honest with myself, I suspect 
that there would be a quiet voice deep in the recesses of my mind asking 
plaintively but insistently – are you sure Timbo? 
 
